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CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Prof. Dr. P. Marcus 
Enormous changes have taken place in the criminal justice system 
ofthe United States overthe past thirty years. Entire blocks ofthe system have 
been restructured in order to preserve individual rights and liberties and to 
promote a more fair and effective trial process ( I ). Few of these changes have 
resulted from federal legislative (2) or executive initiatives (3) or activities 
from individual states (4). Instead, most of these reforms have directly 
resulted from federal judicial rulings, especially cases from the United States 
Supreme Court. 
In this article, I will explore three of the most fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the American Constitution and consider the manner in which 
they have been reformed over the past several decades. The emphasis here 
is on the right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, 
the privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, and the 
accused' s right to be represented by an attorney found in the Sixth 
Amendment (5). 
1. The right to privacy under the fourth amendment. 
A. Introduction. 
The Fourth Amendmentto the United States Constitution provides 
that the people have the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," and such right 
"shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
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supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the persons or things to be seized". 
The Fourth Amendment was intended to curb the search and 
eizure abuses under the English Colonial system involving general warrants 
and writs of assistance (6). It represents an implementation of the principle 
that peoples' homes are their castles which are not to be invaded by any 
general authority to search and eize (7). Courts construe the amendment 
liberally and its protections extend to both the guilty and innocent. 
B. The Law Prior to Mapp v. Ohio 
In the century after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme 
Court did little to interpret the Fourth Amendment. In 1886, in Boyd v. United 
States (8), the Court held that the forced disclosure of papers amounting to 
evidence of crime violated the Fourth Amendment and that such items 
therefore were inadmissible in the defendant 's trial. Although the Fourth 
Amendment contained no explici t excl usionary rule, "the seizure of a man 's 
private books and papers to be used in ev idence against him is [not] 
sub tantiall y different from compelling him to be a witness aga inst 
him elf'(9). 
Thirty years later the Court held that the Founh Amendment itse lf 
bars the u e of ev idence obtained through an unreasonable search and se izure 
in federal prosecutions. "To su tai n unlawful invas ion of the sanctity of his 
home by [federalJ officers of the law would be to affi rm by judicial decision 
a manife t neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the 
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized 
action" (10). This exc lusionary rule, however. did not apply to illegally 
obtained evidence in state couns since the Bill of Rights wa ' designed as a 
limitation on the federal government only and the "Founh Amendment is not 
directed to individual misconduct of [ tate] official s" ( II ). 
The question. however, was whether the adoption of the Founeenth 
Amendment, which forbids the states from "depriving any person of life, 
I ibeny, or property, without due process of law," meant that the protections 
of the Bill of Rights were to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment 
and applied to the states. [n 1949 the Court found that the excl usionary rule 
adopted in federal case did not apply to the tates ince it was not "derived 
fro m the explici t requirements of the Fourth Amendment" (12). In allowing 
the tates to use their own methods to enforce the Fourth mendment, the 
Coun stated : "Granting that in practice the exclusion of ev idence may be an 
effective way of deterring unrea onable searches, it is not for this court to 
condemn as fa lling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process 
Clause a State's reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, 
would be equally effective" (13). In tead, the Counleft it up to the states to 
provide "remedies of private action and uch protection as the internal 
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discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may 
afford" (14). 
It was not until 1952 that the Court began to chip away at this 
doctrine when it fashioned an exception to its earlier holding. In a landmark 
decision, the Court found that the Due Process Clause required exclusion of 
evidence obtained by government "conduct that shocks the conscious" (15). 
In 1960, the Court abolished the "silver planer doctrine." Under this doctrine, 
evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure was 
admissible in federal prosecutions if the search was conducted by state 
officials and no federal officer participated in the search (16). 
C. Mapp v. Ohio . 
Mapp v. Ohio (17) is one of the revol utionary criminal justice cases 
of the twentieth century. There the Court extended its earlier ruling and 
decided that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of 
the Constitution would be inadmissible in both federal and state courts. 
Since the Fourth Amendment...has been declared enforceable 
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion 
as is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise ... the assurance 
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be a "form of 
words," valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of 
inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state 
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its 
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing 
evidence as not to merit this Court' s high regard as a freedom "implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty"(l8). 
The major purposes of the exclusionary rule finalized in Mapp are 
to promote judicial integrity and provide for the deterrence of illegal police 
action. In recent years, there has been much debate concerning the deterrent 
impact of the exclusionary rule (19). However, there is evidence indicating 
that the doctrine has had important and positive effects. These effects include 
the "dramatic increase in the use of search warrants where none were used 
before; stepped up efforts to educate police on Fourth Amendment la w where 
such training had before been virtually non-existent; and the creation and 
development of better working relationships between police and 
prosecutors" (20). 
D. Changes in the Fourth Amendment. 
Opponents argue that the exclusionary rule should be replaced 
because it penalizes the public for police errors (21). While the rule has not 
been struck down, it has been narrowed considerably in application. For 
instance, a defendant may claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule only 
if her own personal privacy rights have been violated. Under this "standing 
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doctrine," she cannot vicariously assert violations of the rights of others (22). 
The fundamental inquiry to be made in deciding whether the defendant has 
Fourth Amendment standing is whether the conduct which the defendant 
wants to put in issue involved an intrusion into her reasonable expectation of 
privacy (23). In other words, the individual must have exhibited an actual 
subjective expectation of privacy and society must be prepared to recognize 
that expectation as reasonable (24) . 
Emphasis on the reasonable expectation of privacy can shrink 
dramatically the scope of the exclusionary rule , as in California 
v. Greenwood (25) . The Court there fo und that the Fourth Amendment does 
not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of sealed garbage bags left 
outside one 's home for collection on the driveway. In that case, police 
officers investigating the defendant searched an opaque trash bag that they 
had obtained from the defendant's garbage collector. Inside the bag, they 
found drug paraphernalia which then served as a basis for obtaining a warrant 
to search the defendant's home. The Court ruled that the trash bags were 
abandoned and thus not covered by the Fourth Amendment. Even though the 
defendant may have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, such an 
expectation was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 
While the Mappexclusionary rule has survived to the present day, 
it has been greatly limited. The rule no longer bars the use of evidence 
obtained by a police officer pursuant to a search warrant. ultimately found 
to be inva lid, if the officer was "acting in reasonable reliance" upon such 
warrant. In United States v. Leon (26), the Supreme Court balanced the 
soc ietal costs of preventing the use of inherently trustworthy tangible 
evidence in the prosecution's case against the vindication of Fourth Amendment 
violations. A majority of the Justices concluded that suppress ion was 
unjusti fied in such cases where an officer had reasonably relied on the judicial 
authorization (27). 
This good-faith exception does not extend to cases in which the 
police have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant properly 
issued (28). For instance, the exception will not apply to the case in which the 
magistra te issued the warrant in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false 
affidav it (29); the situation in which the magistrate abandoned his judicial 
role and failed to act in a neutral and detached manner; the case of the 
warrant being based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and the 
situation where the warrant was so facially deficient that an offlcer could not 
reasonably have believed it to be valid (30). 
The impact of the Fourth Amendment has also been limited 
because. of the S~pr~me court' s rulings as to waiver and consent. A person 
may waIve constItutional protections by agreeing to a warrantless search by 
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the government. A search based upon consent may be undertaken without 
a warrant or probable cause and allows any evidence discovered during the 
search to be introduced at trial. The question is whetherthis consent was given 
voluntarily. The answer to this question will be upheld on appeal unless the 
trial court's finding is "clearly erroneous" (31). The trial judge in making this 
determination must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
defendant's consent to decide if it was freely and voluntarily given (32). 
Many factors are relevant in deciding whether consent is free and 
voluntary including: knowledge of the right to refuse consent; the youth of 
the accused; low intelligence; lack of education of the person giving consent; 
awareness of constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and 
prolonged nature ofthe questioning; and the use of physical punishment such 
as the deprivation of food or sleep and other intrusive police behavior. 
Although each of these factors is relevant there is no "single controlling 
cri terion" on the issue of voluntariness (33).' The circumstances surrounding 
the polic.e-citizen encounter are especially relevant in determining whether 
consent 1S freely and voluntarily given or whether police conduct was so 
mtrus1ve as to result in an involuntary consent (34). 
Generally, any person with a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the place being searched can consent to a warrantless search. Therefore, any per~on With common authority over the place or effects searched can give 
vahd consent ,and evidence found during the search may be used against that 
person and the other owners or Occupants (35). Courts find the conse~t o~ eac~ 
person Who has such mutual use and access to the property to be bmdmg 1f 
!t is reasonable to recognize that the person has the right to permit the 
mspection and that others have assumed the risk that common areas may be 
searched (36). For example, when two persons share an apartment, either 
person can consent in the other's absence to a search of the common areas 
such as the liVing room, but not necessarily to private areas such as a closet 
used entirely by one person. 
ll. Fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
A. Introduction. 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "no person shall be compelled 
. . h ' If" No penalty can be 10 any criminal case to be a witness agamst Imse . . . . . 
attached to a defendant who asserts his privilege against self-mcnml~atlOn 
d & d t' failure to testlfy at and a prosecutor carmot comment on the elen an s 
trial (37). 
The privilege against self-incrimination reflects: . . 
"many of our fundamental values and most noble asplf~tlOns; our 
unWillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel tnlemma of 
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self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial 
rather than inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-
incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; 
our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by 
requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the 
entire load ... ; the right of each individual to a private enclave where he may 
lead a private life ... ; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our 
realization that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often 
a protection to the innocent" (38). 
Traditionally, three purposes have been cited for the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination. First, it demonstrates concern that 
confessions obtained under coercion are not the product of the defendant's 
free will and may be unreliable evidence. Second, the privilege reflects the 
fact that the American criminal justice system is adversarial, not inquisitorial 
and the government should therefore have the burden of proving the 
defendant's guilt. In the flfst of the imponant Fifth Amendment cases, Malloy 
v. Hogan (39), the Coun wrote: 
"The American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not 
inquisitorial, and ... the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay ... 
Governments, state and federal , are thus constitutionally compelled to 
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not 
by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth" (40). 
Third, like the exclusionary rule in the Founh Amendment, the bar 
against the use of compelled self-incrimination provides a deterrent to 
coercive government conduct (41) . 
The Supreme Coun initially dealt with confessions admitted in 
criminal proceedings in terms of fundamental fairness required by the Fifth 
Amendment and Founeenth Amendment Due Process Clauses. In Brown 
v.Mississippi (42), the Coun held that a confession obtained by brutally 
beating the defendant was inadmissible because police interrogation was pan 
of the process by which states procure convictions and is therefore subject to 
the requirements of due process. 'The due process clause requires that state 
action , whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the 
fundamental principles of libeny and justice which lie at the base of all our 
civil and political institutions" (43) . 
This due process "voluntariness test" requires examination of "the 
totality of the circumstances" surrounding each confession to determine 
whether it was given voluntarily or whether the conduct of the police 
eliminated the defendant's free will (44). The relevant factors in determining 
the voluntariness of a confession include the age, intelligence, and 
experience of the accused, as well as the conduct of the police in obtaining 
the statement. Confession cases considered by the Supreme Court have 
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involved actual or threatened physical brutality such as deprivation of food, 
water, and sleep (45); keeping the naked defendant in a small cell (46); 
threatening him with violence (47). When such outrageous government 
conduct is present, there is no need to weigh or measure its effects on the will 
of the individual victim because the conduct is so inherently coercive as to 
violate due process and mandate suppression of the evidence (48). 
This due process "voluntariness test", however, has presented 
several problems. The vague test left the police with little guidance. Also, trial 
judges, in resolving confession disputes, had to consider each case on its own 
particular facts. To resolve this problem, the Supreme Court began to develop 
more specific standards in dealing with the confession problem . . 
In Escobedo v. Illinois, (49) the Supreme Court reasoned that in 
order to give true meaning and substance to constitutional protections, a 
defendant must be informed of his rights, at least in certain situations. The 
Court spoke broadly of the matter. 
"No system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes 
to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through 
unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving 
should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, 
he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the exercise of 
constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law 
enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system (50). 
The Court in 1966 decided Miranda v. Arizona (51) and developed 
far more specific guidelines for law enforcement officials and the judiciary 
to follow in future confession cases. 
B. Miranda v. Arizona. 
In its Miranda opinion, the Supreme Court dealt with four separate 
cases in which defendants had been questioned by the police after having 
been arrested and taken to a police station. In none of the cases had the 
defendant been given a full warning of his rights prior to the interrogation. 
Chief Justice Warren wrote of his concern as to "incommunicado interrogation 
of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere resulting in self-incriminating 
statements without full warnings of constitutional rights" (52). Under such 
circumstances, the Court concl uded, there had been a violation of defendant's 
right against self-incrimination, and that constitutional violation required 
that the defendant's confession be excluded from evidence. 
Where the accused was subjected to "custodial interrogation," the 
Court would automatically find that the interrogation violated the suspect's 
right against self-incrimnation unless the prosecution could establish that the 
suspect was given a full warning of his rights and he voluntarily waived those 
rights and agreed to be questioned. The Court fashioned the Miranda rule both 
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to protect individual rights and to give law enforcement officials guidelines 
to avoid coercive interrogation. The holding was quite explicit: any person 
who is "deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way" may not be 
questioned unless he waives his rights after being informed (1) "that he has 
the right to remain silent," (2) "that anything said can and will be used against 
the individual in court," (3) "that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and 
to have the lawyer with him during interrogation," and (4) " that if he is 
indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him (53)." 
Although no "talismanic incantation" of the Miranda warnings is 
necessary, (54) the current practice is to read suspects their Miranda 
warnings from printed cards carried by police officers before talking to 
suspects. The result is a relatively uniform law enforcement procedure 
everywhere in the United States. The Miranda decision thus has provided 
much needed guidance to police officers and greatly simplified judicial 
review of police interrogation practices. 
C. The issues of custody and interrogation. 
Custody and interrogation are the two prerequisites that trigger 
Miranda's protections . The Court defined custodial interrogation as 
questioning initiated by law enforcement officials after a person has been 
deprived of freedom of action in a significant way. Courts look to the totality 
of the circumstances to determine if an individual is in custody. Whether a 
suspect is in custody depends on the perception of a reasonable person in the 
suspect' s position. For example, in one case, the Supreme Court held that a 
person detained briefly after a routine traffic stop was not in custody for 
purposes ofMiranda(55). In that case, a police officer stopped the defendant's 
car to administer a sobriety test after watching it weave in and out of traffic. 
After the defendant failed the test, the officer asked the defendant if he had 
been drinking. The defendant responded in the affirmative and the Court held 
the statements admissible despite the absence of Miranda warnings. The 
Justices acknowledged that a traffic stop significantly curtails a driver' s 
freedom of action; still , they found that the coerciveness of the stop is limited 
by its brief and public nature (56) . 
Perhaps the most important case exploring the term "custody" is 
Oregon v. Mathiason (57). There, a police officer left a note at the defendant' s 
apartment stating that he wanted to talk with the defendant. When the 
defendant called the officer, they arranged to meet at the police station a few 
blocks from the defendant's apartment. The officer told the defendant that his 
fmgerprints had been found at the scene of a burglary, and the defendant 
confessed. The Court held the statement admissible since the defendant was 
deemed not to be in custody during questioning at the police station because 
he was "free to leave." "Simply because the questioning takes place in the 
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[police] station house, or because the questioned person is one who the police 
suspect," does not, in itself, constitute custody (58). 
Consistent with this view is the case holding that interrogation that 
occurs at the defendant 's home may still be custodial, despite the familiar 
surroundings. In Orozco v. Texas(59), the Supreme Court concluded that the 
defendant was in custody and Miranda therefore applied. There four police 
officers entered the defendant' s bedroom at 4:00 in the morning, blocked his 
exit, and then questioned him about a shooting (60). 
These cases reflect the need to evaluate each custody claim 
individually. The courts must consider a multitude of factors such as the 
extent of the deprivation of the defendant' s action, the suspect 's being told 
that he is free to leave, any physical restraints, the number of officers present, 
and the location of the interrogation. 
Because Miranda protects against the inherently coercive nature 
of custodial interrogation, Miranda warnings are not required unless the 
suspect is both in custody and is being interrogated. In Rhode Island v. Innes 
(61), the Court defined interrogation as "express questioning or its functional 
equivalent" (62). The Court refined this definition to include "words or 
actions that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect" (63). 
Determining whether interrogation has taken place can be quite 
difficult. In Arizona v. Mauro (64) , the Court wrote that "psychological 
ploys" by the police to elicit incriminating responses may constitute 
interrogation for the purposes of Miranda even though no "questions" are 
asked (65). Comments specifically directed to the accused may constitute 
interrogation even if not in the form of questions (66). Quite similar 
comments between officers -overheard by the suspect but not directed at 
him- may not be interrogation(67). The crucial inquiry is whether the 
comments were "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response". 
D. Limitations on the fifth amendment. 
The broad holding of Miranda has been subject to several 
important limitations. The Supreme Court established the so-called public 
safety exception to Miranda in New York v. Quarles (68). The police chased 
a reportedly anned rape suspect into a grocery store and arrested him. A frisk 
revealed an empty shoulder holster so the officers asked the suspect where 
his gun was. He pointed to a shelf and said ,"The gun is over there," and the 
police found a revolver. The Supreme Court wrote that "on these facts there 
is a public safety exception" to the requirement that Miranda warnings be 
given before his statement could be used against him. Miranda represents a 
willingness to impose procedural safeguards "when the primary social cost 
of those added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions" (69). 
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However, "the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to 
the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the 
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self incrimination"(70). 
The other major limitation on the requirements of Miranda is that 
the government may use statements elicited from the defendant in violation 
of Miranda to impeach the defendant 's direct testimony if she takes the stand 
and denies the confession. The pre-trial statement is used to impeach her in 
court testimony. The jury is instructed that the confession may not be 
considered as evidence of guilt, but only on the issue of whether the defendant 
is telling the truth at trial (71). However, this impeachment tool can only be 
used if the defendant personally testifies. It cannot be used to counter the 
testimony of other defense witnesses. Otherwise, using illegally obtained 
evidence to impeach witnesses would chill a defendant's right to present a 
defense by precluding the testimony of those who might make statements in 
sufficient tension with the tainted evidence to permit impeachment (72). 
Many questions in recent years have been raised regarding the 
state of mind of the confessing suspect. Before the prosecution can introduce 
a defendant's incriminating statement in its case, it must prove a voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent waiver of the accused's Miranda rights. Although 
an express waiver is not necessary, courts may not presume a waiver simply 
from a defendant' s silence or subsequent confession (73). Acourt in 
determining voluntariness of the waiver must look to both the suspect's state 
of mind and the police officer's acts of inducement. Because the question is 
a difficult one, police often obtain a formal waiver, although such an explicit 
relinquishment of the right to remain silent is neither essential nor necessarily 
conclusive (74). 
The waiver assessment is made by looking to the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation (75). The most important factors 
in this analysis include the suspect's age, intelligence and education; his 
familiarity with the American criminal justice system; his physical and 
mental condition; and the nature of the government's activity . No one factor 
will necessarily be dispositive. Courts will also consider factors such as the 
explicitness of the waiver, any language barriers, and the length of time 
between the Miranda warnings and the actual questioning or confession. "A 
heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant . 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appointed or retained 
counsel" (76). 
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III. Six amendment right to counsel 
A. Introduction. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, "the accused shall enjoy the right ... 
to have the assistance of Counsel for his defence." This provision guaranteed 
a right to privately retained counsel from its inception and, since 1938, has 
required the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant in a federal 
prosecution (77). The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance 
of this right. 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it 
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science oflaw ... He 
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even 
though he may have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel 
at every step in the proceeding against him. Without it, though he be not 
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence (78). 
More than half a century ago, the Supreme Court held that the right 
to appointed counsel in federal prosecutions for poor people was mandated 
by the Sixth Amendment. In Johnson v. Zerbst the Court wrote that the Sixth 
Amendment requires counsel "in all criminal prosecutions." The amendment 
therefore "withholds from the federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the 
power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has 
or waives the assistance of counsel" (79). 
The issue was far more troubling with state prosecutions. The 
Supreme Court was quite reluctant to incorporate the counsel mandate of the 
Sixth Amendment to apply against the states. Rejecting an absolute application 
of the counsel clause to the states, the courts instead were directed to appoint 
attorneys only under"special circumstances" (80). The Court's view was that 
a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant did not necessarily 
violate due process. The state courts were told to consider the "totality of the 
facts" in individual cases to determine if appointed counsel was necessary to 
prevent "denial of fundamental fairness , shocking to the universal sense of 
justice"(81 ). 
B. Gideon v. Wainwright. 
In 1963, the Supreme Court rejected the "totality of the facts" test 
and ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "fundamental and 
essential to a fair trial" and therefore rendered obligatory upon the states by 
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the landmark case of Gideon 
v.Wainwriaght(82), the Court expressly overruled the earlier holdings. "In 
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who 
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is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him" (83) . 
Today, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses all 
federal and state criminal prosecutions that result in imprisonment. The 
Supreme Court has been unwilling to apply the counsel provision to all cases, 
or even all cases which involve the potential for imprisonment (84) . Instead, 
the Court has concluded that "incarceration [is] so severe a sanction that it 
should not be imposed .. . unles's the indigent defendant has been offered 
appointed counsel" (85). As a practical matter, however, virtually all 
defendants do receive counsel due to both the large number of public defender 
officers and an important recent case. In Baldasar v. Illinois (86), the Court 
held that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not later be used 
under an enhanced penalty provision to obtain an increased sentence on a 
subsequent charge. Thus in practice, nearly every defendant is granted 
appointed counsel, regardless of the possibility that he will not be imprisoned 
then, because future judges may wish to rely on the earlier conviction to 
enhance a later convic tion . 
C. Issues raised by Gideon. 
The Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to proceedings 
beyond simply the trial. "Today's law enforcement machinery involves 
critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings 
where the results might well settle the accused 's fate and reduce the trial itse lf 
to a mere formality" (87). The Sixth Amendment 's right to counsel applies 
to certain "critical stages" of a criminal proceeding when an attorney's 
presence is necessary to secure the defendant' s right to a fair trial. One of the 
most important of these points is the postindictment, pretrial lineup. There 
the presence of counsel might prevent prejudicial identification procedures 
and enable counsel to reconstruct and challenge those procedures at trial (88). 
The right to counsel at a pre-trial stage attaches only at the formal 
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings "whether by way of formal 
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment" (89). 
"The initiation of adversary judicial proceedings marks the commencement 
of the' criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of the 
Sixth Amendment are applicable" (90) . The right to counsel does not extend 
to police lineups conducted prior to the time the accused is indicted or 
otherwise formally charged with the crime. Furthermore, the right does not 
apply to procedures that do not require the defendant's presence. For 
example, the defendant has no right to counsel at a photographic display (9 1). 
A defendant mus t re ly upon due process principles to challenge 
unnecessarily sugges tive procedures that occur at non-critical stages (92). 
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. In some cases, due process may also provide an indigent defendant 
a rIght to assistance other than counsel at trial. This assistance may come in 
the form of an investigator or an expert witness to assist in the preparation 
or presentation of the defense(93). The Supreme Court noted that it never held 
that "a State must purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that 
his wealthier counterpart might buy," only that due process requires that the 
indigent defendant be given the "basic tools" necessary to present his 
defense (94). 
Many state jurisdictions give the trial judge di scretion to provide 
assistance other than counsel, such as medical experts, or investigators (95), 
fingerprint experts (96) , or experts on social attitudes (97) . In federal court, 
by statute, the defendant may "obtain investigative, expert, or other services 
~ecessary for an adequate defense," again at the discretion of the trial 
Judge (98). 
D. Waiver of the right to counsel. 
In Faretta v. California (99) the Supreme Court held that an 
accused has a Sixth Amendment ri llht to waive assistance of counsel and 
conduct her Own defense in a crimi~al case. The right cannot be restricted 
due to the defendant's lack of experience or legal u·aining. This right to 
proceed pro se, however, is not absolute. A judge may terminate self-
representation if the defendant engages in "serious and obstructionist 
misconduct" that interferes with the proceeding (100). 
To proceed pro se, a defendant must knowingly and intelligently 
waive the right to counsel. A trial court ' s refusal to accept such a waiver is 
reversible error. To ensure a valid waiver of counsel, the trial judge should 
inquire into the defendant 's awareness of the disadvantages of self-
representation. Although the scope of this inquiry has not been precisely 
defined, the Supreme Court has imposed rigorous requirements on the 
information that must be imparted to a defendant, requiring a "searching or 
formal inquiry" before affirming a waiver of the right to counsel at trial (10 I). 
Once again, a valid waiver of counsel need not be express. Still , courts are 
very hesitant to validate an implied waiver, particularly if doubt exists as to 
its voluntariness (102). 
IV. Conclusion. 
Since World War II, dramatic reforms have taken place in the 
criminal justice system of the United States. The changes discussed above 
dealing with search and seizure, the privilege against self-incrimination, and 
the right to counsel have significantly restructured the way in which criminals 
are prosecuted throughout the nation. While the three areas are still evolving 
and changing further, it is highly unlikely that there will be enormous 
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movements to step back from these changes. What is so striking about the 
changes, however, is that they have been achieved almost entirely as a result 
of judicial opinions rather than legislative enactments or executive decrees. 
In terms of reforms in the criminal justice system, the American judicial 
process reigns supreme. 
(I ) In very recent times a strong move has occurred to bring about reforms in other 
aspects of the system, particularly looking to the ro le of the victim . See, Payne v. 
Tennessee, III S.O. 2597 (199 1); Maryland v. Craig, II 0 S.O. 3 157 (1990); 
Michigan v. Lucas, III S.O . 1743 (199 1). 
(2) Some important legislation has been passed by the federal Congress such as the 
Speedy Trial Act, 18 V.S.c. § 3 16 1. Still . the major reforms have not been due to 
legislative ac tion. 
(3) Here, too, the executive branch- at the behest of the President- has brought 
about some changes, such as in the de fi nitional aspects of crime. The much heralded 
RICO statute, Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 V.S.c. 
§ 196 1 et. seq is the most famous example. Few structura l changes, however, come 
from executive activ ities. 
(4) Several state supreme courts - under state const itutional provisions- have 
moved beyond limited federal protections for individual defendants and have 
broadened the scope of protection in a number of important ways. See, for instance, 
Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 6 1. 507 N.E. 2d 1029 ( 1987); People 
v.S porleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983); Statev . Novembrino, lOS N.J. 95,5 19 A.2d 
820 ( 1987), all dealing with privacy concerns. 
(5) Certainl y many other extremely important areas have changed as a result of 
Supreme Court ac tions. See. e.g., reforms under the double jeopardy clause, Grady 
v. Corbin ,495 V.S. 508 ( 1990); the rights involved with appeals, Griffin v.Cali fo rnia, 
380 U.S. 609 (1965); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 ( 1963); the confrontation 
clause, Davis v. Alaska, 4 15 U.S. 308 (1974); and the puni shment provision of the 
Eight Amendment, see, these cases setting limits on the death penal ty: Bullington 
v. Missouri , 45 1 U.S. 430 ( 198 1); Californi a v. Brown, 479 U.S . 538 ( 1987); Coker 
v. Georgia, 433 U.S . 584 (1977); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 ( 1986); and 
Penry v. Lynaugh. 109 S.O. 2934 (1989). The three areas discussed in this paper, 
however, have fundamentall y reformed the system. 
(6) Boyd v. United States, 11 6 U.S . 6 16 (1886) . ("One of the primary ev ils intended 
to be e liminated by the Fourth Amendment was the mass ive intrusion on privacy 
undertaken in the collec tion of taxes pursuant to general warrants and writs of 
ass istance . ") 
(7) Torcia, Charles E., Wharton 's Criminal Procedure, 13th Ed., 483, ci ting Sgro 
v. Uni ted Stales, 287 U.S. 206 (1932). 
(8) 11 6 U.S. 6 16 ( 1886). 
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